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Several years ago I attended a debate at the Oxford debating union . The
debated proposition read: "This house thinks that the cloning of human
beings is unethical." Arguing in favor of the proposition was Ian Wilmut,
head of the Scottish research team that successfully cloned Dolly the
sheep. Arguing against was the well-known Oxford Darwini an and
militant atheist, Richard Dawkins.
Wilmut's argument against human cloning was balanced and
moderate: his research team had a less than 1% success rate in transferring
cloned sheep embryos into female sheep uteruses; given the much greater
complexity of human development, there promi ses to be an even lower
success rate with human cloning; nor have we any confidence that having
successfully cloned and transferred a human embryo, there will not result
monstrous developmental deformities. Since the only way to perfect the
procedure is to work out the kinks through repeated experimentation, and
since thi s means a massive wastage of human embryos and grave threat to
the welfare of clones who survive, the experimentation should not be
started in the first place.
Dawkins scoffed at Wilmut's warnings. Sure, he said, the kinks need
to be worked out, and until that time research ought to proceed with great
cauti on; but rest assured, they will be worked out. He then turned to the
audie nce and said : "Twenty years ago we experienced a non-rationally
grounded emotional repugnance at the prospect of ' test-tube babies'; today
IVF is a common and widely accepted form of assisted reproduction. Our
present emotionaJ misgivings about human cloning are no less irrational.
Mark my words, twenty years from now human cloning will be as
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widespread and warmly embraced as IYF is today." The audience sat in
silence as if saying by their blank expressions, " I may not like it, but what
he says sounds true." The proposition nan'owly passed.
There i pressure at the local , national and intemationallevel to give a
green light to human cloning, at least for purposes of biomedical research.
Liberal politicians (Democrats and Republicans) are joining forces with
biotec h co mpanies, Holl ywood figure s like Michael J. Fox, Chri stopher
Reeve and Carol Burnett, and the ever-biased American media to
c haracteri ze opponents as narrow-minded religious conservatives, as antiscienti fie , and as ideologues motivated by petty " pro-life" pol itics
indiffere nt to profound human suffering. Neveltheless, the question needs
to be as ked: "Ought we now or ever do thi s kind of research ?" In thi s essay,
I argue " No."

I. Cloning: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer
Prese ntly the most common type of human cloning is called somatic
cell nuclear transfer. It begins with a female gamete (i.e. , an oocyte or egg)
harves ted from a donor. In the nucleus of that oocyte is half the genetic
material (DNA) necessary for human development.
In sex ual reproduction the other half is contributed at fertilization by
the male gamete or sperm cell which contains in its nucleus half the genetic
compl ement necessary for human development.
But cloning is asexual reproduction ; no sperm is necessary. The
nucl e us of the female oocyte is removed, leaving the oocyte "enucleated."
The nu cleus of a somatic cell is then extracted (somatic cells are any cells
other than human gametes - oocytes or sperm cell s), and its nuclear
contents transferred into the enucleated oocyte. Since the nucleus of every
somatic cell contains a virtuall y complete genetic complement of the
donor, the oocyte, having received the somatic cell 's nuclear contents (i.e.,
its DNA), now contains all the genetic material necessary for human
development. It is important to understand that the (nuclear) genetic
materi al contained in thi s oocyte is unrelated to the female who donated
the oocyte. Rather its genetic ide ntity is identical to that of the donor of the
so matic cell (who may be male or female or even, theoretically, nonhuman) .
If the so matic cell nucleartransfer is successful, the resulting entity is
no longer an oocyte, but a human zygote, a human being in its earliest stage
of development. With the stimulus of an electrical impulse or with special
chemicals the human zygote will begin actively dividing and be launched
into the dynamic process of human maturation and development.
The purpose for the cloning would be subject to the intention s of the
cloners. Reproductive cloning as it is popularly called, would entail
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implanting the living human embryo in a female uterus and bringing the
child to term. So-called therapeutic cloning would entail cultivating the
embryo in vitro (in the laboratory), then exploiting it for whatever so-called
therapeutic purposes the cloner wills. Presently, the main "therapeutic"
interest is to harvest mature embryonic stem cells, a process that kills the
embryo. Cloning in thi s way is attractive because the cloned embryo would
have the identical nuclear genotype (genetic code) to the donor of the
somatic cell, who may also be the clinical patient. The stem cells and
tissues derived therefrom would have a high degree of biological
compatibility and hence be far less prone to problems of tissue rejection.

II. Ethical Evaluation
Terminology:
The common terminological distinction between "reproductive" and
"therapeutic" cloning is artificial and misleading. Every instance of human
cloning is reproductive insofar as the intention of the cloner is to produce a
new human being at the origins of his or her development. Admittedly, the
intentions of the cloner for using the clone are different - the difference
between having a baby and performing valuable, but destructive
experimentation - but the subject of both is a new human being.
Secondly, the term "therapeutic" implies that the procedure is helpful to the
subject of that procedure. But in therapeutic cloning, no benefit is intended
to the subject; in fact, the procedure is lethal to its subject. 1 It is important
therefore to adopt language that does not contain within itself biases in
favor of an unscrutinized ethical conclusion. For clarity's sake I will adopt
the terminology used by the President's Council on Bioethics in its 2002
report on human cloning, which distinguishes between cloning to produce
children and cloning for biomedical research.
Cloning fo Produce Children:
A matter of control: Many motives can underlie the desire for cloning
to produce children - duplicating individuals exceptional for some talent
or trait; reproducing an image of a dead (or living) loved one; producing
individual s immune from genetic di seases; selecting someone for cosmetic
reasons like sex or physical appearance; making people for use as a source
of spare body parts. More sinister motives - which we have no reason to
impute to present-day defenders of cloning, but which, given the sad
history of human wickedness, ought not be excluded as real possibilities
for our future. These include producing people for purposes of sexual or
economic exploitation, advancing military objectives, or in the interests of
various other forms of human slavery.
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What do all these motives share? They share the will of one
generation to exercise control over another. But doesn ' t any family
planning involve control? Yes, more or less, but not nearl y to thi s degree. In
ordinary family planning a couple undertakes the important deci sion of
determining how many children to have, when, where and under what
conditions to have them. No doubt the family pl anning decisions of
couples can be immoral , especially if they will to bring children in to the
world without the will or manifest ability to nurture them . But their
decision does not touch the real identity of their child.
In cloning, the clone's very own biological identity is controlled. It is
imposed upon her by another, not received as a gift from God as the
incommensurably unique melding of the genetic qualities of the two
parents. And it is imposed for reasons unrelated to the good of the clone.
Her interests cannot log icall y be the subject matter of the choice for her
identity since there is no her prior to the imposition of identity, only a
range of other identities from which to choose. The identity is therefore
chosen, not for her good, but at the di scretion of the choosers, we mi ght say
for their good, a startling exercise of willful domination of one person over
another.
To be clear: in cloning, human biological identity is imposed by the
cloners. To be sure, the control is only over genetic identity, not over one's
full humanity, which is a unity of a material body and immaterial soul. The
clone's soul is created by God and infused in the tiny individual,
presumabl y at the moment her deve lopment begins.2 But biological
identity is essential to human identity. My biology is me, even though I am
more than my biology. Among all that I can consider mine - my bank
account, my house, even my family - little is more essential, more
personal , more self-defining than my bodily identity. The natural process of
human procreation assures that each human person has a unique and
unrepeatable biological identity.
In the case of identical twins (that is, monozygotic twins), that genetic
identity is received by two who share characteristics of biological
subjectivity, but who still receive that identity as a gift. Because of the
relative contemporaneity of their beginnings,3 the twins are still free to
create their own hi stories, albeit more closely identified with one another
than non-twinned siblings.
Cloners, on the contrary, impose the identity of one who already is (or
was), one who already has a history. Thi s is a violation of what it seems to
me is a natural right of the human person, namel y, the right to subjective
identity. Cloning is a form of radically unjust violence against the clone's
personal subjectivity. It is also a violation of the fundamental principle of
human equality since the clone in her origins stands in relation to the cloneI'

August, 2004

235

not as proceeding under (more or less) equal conditions but in the relation
of maker to product. Christians understand thi s willful and unju st control
over another's subjective identity to have even more profound implications.
The biological identity we receive through the seemingly chance process
we call fertilization, is an identity whose trajectory stretc hes beyond
temporal horizons. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body
illumines for us the reality that the body I possess now will be directly
related to the bodily identity I will possess for all eternity.
The abolition of sexual reproduction: Cloning renders human
generation asexual. A male and female are no longer required for bringing
forth of new life. Females are required as egg donors, and males not at all.
The notion of maternity is muddled: is the egg donor mother, or the
somatic cell donor, or the woman who carries the child to term? And the
notion of biological paternity is virtually abolished altogether. Cloning
perverts the basic relational structure of the human person. A clone does
not have a biological mother and father, but rather a si ngle progenitor. She
might be the twin sister of her mother, the daughter of her grandfather, or
the twin of an aborted baby. The old folk song, "I' m My Own Grandpa"
takes on a whole new meaning. In vitro has already confused the bonds of
kinship, but cloning renders them almost meaningless .
Moreover, cloning displaces the specifically conjugal (COining
together) dimension of human procreation within the logic of human love
and self-giving into an impersonal project of laboratory research within the
logic of industrial production (Let's not fool ourselves, cloning will become an
industry with enormous economic implications.). Is there any natural
human reality more intimate, sublime and consequential , indeed more
human , than the flowering of conjugal love into the fresh blossom of new
life? In cloning, the link between conjugal love and procreation is severed. ~
Thi s is not to say that the cloners would not be personall y interested in, or
committed to, or emotionally invested in the product of the procedure. But
the intensity of sentiment surrounding the process should not obsc ure the
reality of what it is: the process is not begetting, it is making.
The advent of asexual human reproduction strikes at the heart of
Chri sti an anthropology by rendering the complementarity of the sexes
in·elevant. Chri stian revelation teaches that God made humanity " male and
female"; neither male alone nor female alone. Man and woman represent
in their integral individuality two different types, two unique
complementary embodiments (embodied manifestations) of the spiritual
being we call the human person, each having his respective significance for
himself and for the other according to the divine plan. In other words, it
was part of God 's will that there be two sexes; God wants two sexes. The
Genesis 1 creation narrative gives one foundation for thi s differentiation:
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God 's command to "be fruitful and multiply, fill the em1h and subdue it"
tells us that sex ual differentiation and complementarity are rel ated to
procreation. At the very heart of the Christian conception of the origins of
the human person is the belief that God created man and woman to be
joined together in an embrace that is intrinsically meaningful for the
bringing forth of new life. Hence, Christian faith supports what the natural
law prescribes, namely, that marital cleaving (marital sex ual intercourse) is
the only fitting context for the bringing forth of new life.'

Cloning for Biomedical Research:
The nature and identity (the "status" of the human embryo: Many, if
not most, who defend human cloning defend it not for purposes of
producing children but for biomedical research. Cloning research can be
justified, they maintain , because of its utility in curing disease and
relieving human suffering. It is unfortunate (they say) that human embryos
will be destroyed in the process but this unf0l1un ate consequence is
justified by the promi sed results.
The determining ethical question to be asked is what is the nature and
identity of the cloned embryo? Is the embryo a human life and therefore a
full human being? Or is it merely pre- or potential human life, something
that will become but is not yet a member of the human family (something
defenders of destructive embryo experimentation routinely assert)? If it is
merely pre-human, then lethal experimentation upon it, for compelling
reasons, might be justified since the subject would not be a human being.
But if the human embryo is human life, then cloning for research purposes
would simply be the deliberate creation and subsequent disposal of human
life for the sale benefit of others. How do we resolve this question ? We
begi n by looking at the empirical facts.
Before the transfer of the somatic cell's nucleus into the enucleated
egg the human ti ssues collected for manipulation are clearly not internally
organized whole human individual s. The oocyte and so matic cell are
donated body cells of other whole self-organizing human individuals,
extensions we might say of those individuals. After the transfer and
successful stimulation of embryonic development, we are no longer
dealing with a mere part of another's body, but with a newly organized
whole, albeit immature, living member of the species homo sapiens. 6
Let us examine this assertion. The individual is whole and selforganizing, insofm' as it contains within itself the epigenetic primordia (i.e. ,
the complete genetic code and living dynamism) for internally coordinated
development into a fully mature member of the species. Yes, it needs
nurture from outside itself, but so do newborns, the infirm and the elderly.
Actually everyone, arguably, at every stage of development needs nurture
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from outside himself for healthy human development. It is living (as
opposed to dead, or not yet living), insofar as it has come into existence as
an entity with an enduring reality - with a history - that will include
organized self-moving natural development towards full maturity. And it is
indubitably human, not canine, bovine or feline, and will in a brief timewithin eight or so weeks - actively develop a morphology that will
identify it as such even to the untrained eye.
What sense can be made of calling it merely pre-human life and
hence of denying it full human rights? Some reply, because it is not till day
fourteen - the onset of development of the primitive streak - that
monozygotic twinning can no longer occur. Since before this point the
human embryo can twin, that is, split in two (sometimes more) embryos, it
follows (they say) that it is not yet a unitary human life; the living being
that is identical with the later being with a developed personality has not
yet emerged. But this logic is fallacious. Granted, it does prove that before
day fourteen the developing human organism has the potential for a split
that will give rise to two (or more) developing human organisms. It also
proves that before twinning we are not dealing with two whole organized
human individuals. But it does not follow that before day fourteen we are
not dealing with any whole human individual.
And we have good reasons for concluding that we are dealing with a
fully human life. Human development begins in the zygote stage and
unfolds seamlessly from that stage through a series of natural internally
self-directed development phases. There is no discreet identifiable moment
nor even series of events after the new organism comes into existence that
can be construed as the beginning of a new organism. If we say it emerges
into humanity sometime after it comes into existence, what is it before that
point? It is not part of another's body, as is an oocyte or somatic cell. It is
not awaiting an origin as a living member of a species, since that takes
place at the zygote stage. It is not awaiting some essential contribution to
its development from outside itself, since from its genesis it contains
within itself the epigenetic primordia for self-directed growth into
adulthood. Both before and after day fourteen the manner and direction of
its maturation is determined by the genetic material contained within it, not
by extrinsic causes. What, therefore, would be the cause of its emergence
into humanity?
Moreover, embryological evidence shows that the embryonic cells
prior to day fourteen do not function as an aggregate of unrelated
noncommunicating cells, but rather as a single organism. They interact,
communicate and are restrained from autonomous development. It is true
that sometimes a totipotent cell splits, giving rise to a newly developing
organism, and, yes, this event normally happens before day fourteen. But
the fact that twinning might occur before day fourteen is insufficient reason
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for concluding that before day fourteen the embryo is an unorganized
aggregate of cell s awaiting some organizing event or principle to bring
them together into a functioning human whole. In other words, the fact that
you can produce two from something does not prove that something is not
presently one, or that it is indetenninate. A flatworm or a plant or an
amoeba is divided and the result is two flatworms , plants (as in cuttings) or
amoebas, but this does nothing to show that prior to such division the
flatworm , plant or amoeba was not a unitary organism.
Since everyone begins his or her existence as an embryo, it is
reasonable to conclude that when we are dealing with a human embryo,
even at its earliest stages of existence, even with the potential for twinning,
we are dealing with a tiny but fully human being, and that the terms zygote
and embryo, like the terms fetus, baby, child and adult, are not terms
designating substantial identity, but rather phases in the development
(maturation) of a being whose substantial identity has already begun.
Some still might be unconvinced. The empirical evidence, they might
argue, does not settle the question of the ethical illegitimacy of lethal
experimentation on the early human embryo. A thought experiment will
help us consider the ethical question from another vantage point. If you
were a military pilot during peacetime, ordered to test incendiary bombs on
a designated target, and your radar gave evidence that there were
unidentified living beings, lots and lots of living beings, stirring at ground
zero ; if you were uncertain, but had good reason to believe that they might
be innocent civilians, would you be ethically justified in dropping your
incendiary bombs on ground zero based on the reasoning that the status of
the objects on your radar screen was uncertain?
The empirical evidence, if not proving conclusively that the early
human embryo is human life worthy of full moral respect, provides good
reasons for concluding as much. At the very least, the evidence leaves in
our minds a serious doubt. The honest scientist or clinician therefore must
inevitably confront the objection: "It might be a human being I'm planning
to create and experiment on, therefore, I might be planning to do something
ten'ibly wrong."
In the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, is not the
scientist, clinician, public official or anyone, for that matter, morally
required to treat the human embryo as a whole human being with human
rights and refrain from actions that would be gravely wrong presuming this
were the case? It is on the basis of this reasoning that the CDF teaches that
"the human being must be respected - as a person - from the very first
instant of hi s existence." (Donum Vitae , I, I ).7 And in its Charter of the
Rights of the Family, the Holy See teaches: "Human life must be absolutely
respected and protected from the moment of conception."8

August, 2004

239

Given the weighty human goods at stake, the burden of proof lies on
the side of the cloners and experimenters to prove beyond any doubt that
the subjects of their experimentation are not human beings. This is
something they clearly have not done, nor does it seem they are interested
in doing, which makes one doubt the sincerity of their commitment to this
important moral question.
The question of utility: But what about the great goods that could
result from cloning for biomedical research? Doesn ' t the goal of
significantly advancing scientific and clinical knowledge and the prospect
of relieving telTible human pain and suffering justify experimentation that
destroys human beings? In other words, don ' t good ends justify bad
means? It is tempting to answer yes. And the temptation increases when
the refraining from doing evil promises the continuation or increase of the
prospect of suffering evil.
The question is not new. It is the ancient question of the legitimacy of
utilitarian morality, a question Socrates famou sly confronted when he
asked the timeless question, is it better to do evil or suffer evil? Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle, and the entire Christian tradition from St. Paul (Rom .
3:8), to St. Augustine, to Thomas Aquinas to John Paul II, answer with one
unbroken voice: to do evil is to become evi1. 9
Moreover, virtually every great world religion and influential moral
philosophy formulates a common demand of morality, a universal moral
norm relevant to the problem of cloning, more ancient than the utilitarian
premise. We find it in Christianity, Judai sm, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Taoism , Confucianism, Sikhism, Jainism , Zoroastrianism, Unitarianism
and Native Spirituality. Christianity calls it the Golden Rule: we should act
toward others as we would wish them to act toward us. It requires us to
place ourselves, in our imagination, in the position of those with whom we
do not ordinarily or naturally identify, like that of a tiny human embryo,
and then ask ourselves, if I were in this position, how would I wish to be
treated ? Which of us would wish to be produced in a laboratory,
experimented upon and then killed?
If my reasoning is COlTect, and the human embryo is a whole living
human being, then asexually producing it, experimenting upon it for
reasons unrelated to its own welfare lo and subsequently destroying it
involves the following grave injustices: 1) A violation of its right to
subjective identity, 2) A violation of its right to be brought into the world in
the context of a loving marital embrace, II 3) A violation of its right not to
be harmfully exploited for another's gain and without its consent,12 and 4)
A violation of its right not to be killed.

240

Linacre Quarterl y

Conclusion
When Loui se Brown, the world's first test-tube baby, was born, the
Patriarch of Venice, Albino Luciani, was one of the first to promise his
prayers for the newborn. Just months later, Luciani was elected pope as
John Paul I, a pontificate that lasted 33 days. There was some consternation
at the archbi shop 's statement for fear it might appear to legitimize the
process by which the baby had been brought into being. Whether or not
this was the case, I do not know. But it was perfectly right that Luciani
should offer hi s prayers for the baby 's well-being. Irrespective of the
process, the baby was, and is, a human being worthy of esteem, protection
and prayers. 13
The same can be said for a human clone, whether it is marked for
embryonic destruction or destined by its cloners for full-tenn deli very. A
human clone will be a full human being, ontologically equal in its humanity to
every other human being, made in God 's image and likeness, redeemed by
the blood of Jesus, and destined for eternal and blissful communion with
the Trinity in heaven, even though he or she will have been brought into
being under morally reprehensible conditions. If cloning to produce
children proceeds successfully, then those who defend human life should
oppose every effort to abort cloned children in utero, exploit them after
birth, or in any other way arbitrarily limit their human rights. Similarly, if
cloning for biomedical research is sanctioned, and another generation of
embryonic human life, like the generation begun with IYF begins,14 then
pro-lifers will expand the scope of their activist concern to include their
welfare and protection. But the Rubicon has not yet been crossed; there is
still a way back. The question as to whether cloners and their advocates
will achieve their legislative or judicial designs has not yet been answered.
Human cloning is an example of value-free science driven by
utilitarian morality. The 1997 Vatican document, Reflections on Cloning,
says it well: "Cloning ri sks being the tragic parody of God's
omnipotence."1 5 Its defense and promotion proclaims, with Nietzsche, the
"death of God." Its acceptance by the Western world will result in the death
of mankind as we know it.
We must answer a question at the heart of morality: is human freedom
(including scientific freedom) for something or is it indifferent? Is it
limited, ethically speaking, solely by the contingency of possi bility, or is it
morall y circumscribed by the requirements of human good, human dignity
and human well-being? Aren't there some thin gs that we should not do,
even though we can do them?
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